Restaurants
and Health Care: a participatory presentation
By
Gary Buurman and Stuart Birks
Centre
for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University
Paper
for the Public Health Association Conference
Palmerston
North, 24-26 July 2000
Abstract
The effectiveness
of health care systems depends on how people behave in the
structures provided. This includes how they respond to the
incentives offered. Often involvement in a system colours our
perceptions. A clearer understanding can sometimes be gained by
first considering an analogous system, after which the findings
can be translated into the environment of interest. Care must of
course be taken to ensure that the analogy is appropriate. If we
say too much beforehand, this might affect people's responses in
the simulation that we will use. However the presentation
illustrates how commonly observed economic principles could
possibly be used to better understand and predict the workings of
health care systems.
Contact details:
Gary Buurman
Centre for Public
Policy Evaluation
Massey University
Palmerston North
Phone: 06-350-5965
Fax: 06-350-5660
Email: G.B.Buurman@massey.ac.nz
Stuart Birks
Centre for Public
Policy Evaluation
Massey University
Palmerston North
Phone: 06-350-5799
X2660
Fax: 06-350-5660
Email: K.S.Birks@massey.ac.nz
Introduction
The example
described in this paper was first used with post-graduate
economics and social policy students at Massey University. We
have subsequently conducted the exercise in several situations,
including in-house training for policy analysts at the Ministry
of Health. We found it to be useful for demonstrating several
economic phenomena in a way that is not daunting for the non-specialist,
while also providing practical applications for economic
theorists.
In general, it is
useful to consider a problem from the diverse viewpoints of the
various participants. The use of an example that is not drawn
from the health sector is also useful for those familiar with the
sector as it avoids preconceived ideas. It may be that people
become locked in to a particular understanding or hold prior
assumptions/beliefs/expectations/prejudices with familiar
structures. Consideration of an alternative situation is a common
lateral thinking tool to give fresh insights. This is what we
attempt to do here.
How to do the
exercise
This can be run
as an interactive group exercise.
What might be
observed
Commonly we see
all or some of the following behaviours by consumers:
·
"Big eaters" are more likely to choose a smorgasbord.
·
People choosing a smorgasbord are likely to eat more than they
would have done otherwise.
·
People choosing a smorgasbord are likely to choose more of the
more expensive items on the menu.
The restaurateurs
are likely to act as follows:
·
In setting the smorgasbord price, they may start with an average
expenditure by diners. They may choose to price somewhere above
the average.
·
They may wish to alter the menu by:
o
Removing or restricting consumption of some of the more expensive
items;
o
Putting out smaller pieces so that people take less;
o
Including low-cost "filler" items that reduce people's
ability to consume other things.
Economic Interpretation:
The main point to
make is that with a smorgasbord, additional food has a zero price
at the point of consumption. Economists realize that in this
situation, customers will continue to consume food up until extra
portions no longer provide them with additional satisfaction (the
marginal utility of the last portion consumed is zero). There are
many parallels to this situation in society, but the main goal is
to apply the smorgasbord situation to insurance in health care
markets. With the smorgasbord option, the major implications are:
·
The customers are likely to consume more food than at an a la
carte setting.
·
Customers will concentrate on the more expensive items as the
effective price reduction is greater.
Thus in setting
the fixed smorgasbord price(s), these factors should be taken
into account. Often our restaurateurs, as mentioned above,
overlook these economic principles.
·
Deleting more expensive items from the smorgasbord or limiting
consumption in other ways.
·
Including low cost filler items, or changing the size
of portions so that people consume/waste less.
·
Changing the smorgasbord price. This might be in terms of a
higher entry fee, differentiating price as to age, making some
items a la carte, or some other adjustment. A two-part
tariff was once suggested where a fixed fee was paid to enter the
restaurant after which smorgasbord items could be purchased at
less than full cost. There could be extra items which will be
consumed although not included in the smorgasbord, such as drinks
for which people pay. These could be relatively highly priced.
The consumers may modify their behaviour once the restaurateurs have addressed their strategy:
·
Some may choose not to purchase the smorgasbord (entry fee
outweighs the expected benefit).
·
However those who consume the most (the big eaters) are still
likely to choose the smorgasbord option.
Parallels with
the Provision of Health Care:
The purpose of
the interactive exercise with the smorgasbord has been to bring
out the problem of moral hazard, insurance and health care in our
courses in Health Economics. In the USA, it is argued that moral
hazard has played a major role in cost inflation in the health
area. The idea is that if health care is left to market forces,
and insurance is present, the result will be excess consumption
of health care. As in the smorgasbord case, comprehensive health
care insurance cover (with no co-payments) lowers the price at
point of service to zero. Since demand depends at least partially
on price, more will be consumed than if there were no charge. The
patient might stay in hospital an extra day or two to be on the
safe side. The same might apply to GP visits or the use of
prescription drugs.
Medical insurance
itself changes the economic incentives that individuals face. The
individual may recognize that overuse will increase insurance
premiums, but the insured individual has little incentive to
limit use. The individual's behaviour affects only a fraction of
total insurance cost, and if the individual curtails use, cost
savings are spread mainly to other policy holders. Yet benefits
of additional use to the individual are great. This is similar to
the smorgasbord example.
Once insurance
companies see what is happening, their dilemma is much like the
one that confronted our restaurateurs. Additional options, which
include new pricing strategies, are needed to keep insurance
companies from losing money in the health care area.
Most discussions
on moral hazard consider that the problem of excess consumption
can be reduced through either coinsurance or deductibles.
Coinsurance means that each insured patient must pay a certain
fraction of each dollar of health costs (say 25%). Thus the
consumer faces a positive price less than the market price, and
the higher the fraction, the less health care that is consumed.
This would equate with the two-part tariff example suggested in
the smorgasbord.
A deductible is
the exclusion of a certain amount of the expense from the
insurance cover. This might mean that the first $100 of any
insurance charge is paid by the consumer. Insurance
companies practice other options, including not providing cover
for certain ailments. This is similar to leaving out certain
dishes, especially the expensive ones, from the smorgasbord.
This analysis can
be applied to New Zealand. In the case of New Zealands
earlier public hospitals (pre-reform), we simply replace
insurance companies with the State. The care then is provided by
the State at zero cost, funded out of tax receipts. Under that
system individuals might have been seen as consuming excess
health care and thus contributing to escalating health costs in
New Zealand. This is an argument put forward to justify co-payments.
We could
speculate further be considering how restaurant behaviour may
differ if there are several competing restaurants. Under these
circumstances restaurants may include specialist dishes so as to
distinguish themselves from their competitors. Similarly,
competing health insurance companies may offer specialist
treatments. This can raise costs overall.
We may also
observe non-price allocation methods in both restaurants and
health care. Hence someone may be cutting and serving the meat in
a restaurant, and there may be an approval mechanism for hospital
treatment. High cost items may not be offered and a limited range
of choices may be made available. One restaurant option can be
expensive add-ons, such as drinks which are charged for in
addition to the basic price of the meal. There may be parallels
in health care, such as additional room service in private
hospitals.
We should be
careful not to stretch the restaurant-healthcare analogy too far.
There may be some differences between the restaurant example and
the case of health care.
People go into a
restaurant knowing that they want to eat. They do not purchase
health insurance knowing that they will need treatment, or how
extensive the treatment might have to be. There are equity issues
with health care which would not apply to restaurants. This ties
in also with the issue of public versus private provision.
Lessons learned
We hope that this
example has demonstrated that economics is not such a mystery. Using
a familiar situation and basic economic principles we have been
able to indicate some of the problems involved in designing an
appropriate health care delivery system. We must be careful not
to stretch an analogy too far, but certainly in this instance
there are many useful similarities.