Policy, Decisions and the Law
by Stuart Birks

Director, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University

Paper for the LEANZ session of the NZAE Conference, 30 June 2004

 

Abstract


Democratic systems are based on more than just the vote. There is a complex division of powers that has evolved over a considerable period of time, providing important checks and balances. A healthy democracy requires its members to be aware of the broader context of their, and others', actions, and their associated responsibilities.

 
Systems evolve, and roles can gradually change. As any economist will realise, changes in one area are likely to result in altered behaviour and changes in other areas.

 
This paper looks at the law and its changing function and operation, especially as a mechanism for decision making and a vehicle for policy. In particular, there are some significant areas of economic and social activity about which the law is increasingly being applied. These include aspects of personal and family life, as well as aspects of health and safety and the environment. Developments can be observed both in terms of new and modified legislation, and through the operation of the courts, including what has been termed judicial activism.

 

The paper attempts to identify and illustrate some of these changes, drawing examples primarily from the area of family law, but with the aim of focusing on broader findings and implications for economics. It is suggested, in particular, that lawyers are being asked, and are electing, to deliberate on matters about which they have little or no expertise. Checks and balances that may have been effective in the past are currently being put to the test. Significant concerns are identified in terms of meeting new expectations and the operation of legal and related institutions in the context of these changes, with associated reservations about the extent to which governments can apply effective policies.

 

Mailing address:        Centre for Public Policy Evaluation

Massey University

Private Bag 11 222

Palmerston North

 

Phone:             06-350-5799 X2660

Fax:                  06-350-5660

Email:               k.s.birks@massey.ac.nz

 

JEL classification numbers: K0, H1

 


1. Introduction

 

The book Defying Hitler: a memoir[1], by Sebastian Haffner, was a best seller in Germany and highly acclaimed when published only a few years ago. Since then its English translation has also been very well received. It was written before World War II by a young man, born in 1907 in Berlin, who experienced the changes in his country that accompanied the rise of Hitler. Later to become a noted writer on German history, this book is in part a description of his personal experience and in part an attempt to understand the wider social and political upheavals of the time.

 

I mention it here because, while Haffner describes an extreme situation, it is in such situations that weaknesses are most apparent. To me, he highlights the complexity and vulnerability of democracy, and the responsibilities that we all share if we are to live in a democratic society. While there is currently talk about bringing democracy to Iraq, this seems to focus on holding free elections. Democracy depends on far more than that.

 

I also mention the book here because this is a session on Law and Economics. Haffner wrote about a period in which he was in training to become a judge, as happens in Germany. This gave him an inside view of the pre-World War II German legal system. Much of economic policy is implemented through the law. How effectively does the law work in this implementation? What limitations are there?

 

2. Lessons from Haffner

 

Haffner makes many interesting observations. His description of the hyperinflation of 1923 would be of particular interest to economists. For the purpose of this paper, though, there are eleven key lessons which may be of value when considering current experience. Relevant extracts from the book are included in Appendix 1 below. While the points say nothing about specific implications for society, they do indicate areas of vulnerability whereby undesirable outcomes could arise. To that extent, they are relevant for today, as indicated by examples in brackets:

 

1)      There can be hidden threats to democracy, with individuals fighting battles in isolation. (Talk of the need to open up the Family Court could be a reflection of people fighting such battles today, with social change occurring through actions behind closed doors.)

2)      It can be harder to understand the wider significance of things that are more personally immediate. (Implications for individuals in Family Court battles can be very significant in terms of contact with family members, and people directly affected by family law number in the hundreds of thousands).

3)      Can people recognise when major changes are occurring? Some significant events occur where “life goes on as normal”, others more dramatic. Major events can be obscured by activities of everyday life. Some “historical” events have little impact on individuals. Some significant events might not be highlighted in history. (The significant rewriting of family law and even of definitions of the family, plus the numbers affected, suggest that we are experiencing major changes. The extent and significance of these changes may not be recognised.)

4)      With the 1923 hyperinflation, past experience counted for nothing: “…the failure of all the rules of life and the bankruptcy of age and experience. (p.51) The younger generation may think that such knowledge and experience are no longer relevant or useful. (On the bankruptcy of age and experience, note the changing nature of family, marriage and work[2], increasing demand for qualifications and the changing concepts of “knowledge” considering post-modernism, feminism, etc., even to the point where the use of logic is questioned[3]).

5)      There can be subtle influences on the attitudes and illusions of children which only have an impact on society 20 or so years later. (Attitudes of children are uncertain, but their experience of life and the information they are given are very different from those of earlier generations. They have no experience of earlier perspectives, but do experience weakened family life and devaluing of customs and traditions.[4])

6)      It may have been significant that a generation grew up without strong family life and fixed customs and traditions. (See comment for point 5.)

7)      If a government compromises fundamental democratic principles, then democracy is devalued and can lose support. (Recent governments have compromised their principles, as illustrated by domestic violence legislation, and social engineering through subtle changes.[5])

8)      People are commonly prepared to handle the problems of the previous generation, and this may result in their being constrained or blinkered as to what might occur. (There is no clear picture of the future for young people, so they grow up with a mix of new expectations about, for example, education and work, and other unstated expectations carrying over from the past, such as for family life, say.)

9)      When a group is attacked, attention may then be focused on that group, rather than on those making the threat. (There have been consistent attacks on men as a group in society, even from the core of government, as with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. If feminists are so critical of men, should we be scrutinizing men, or questioning the motives and reasoning of feminists?[6])

10)  Major changes, even if contrary to fundamental principles, can occur in an orderly manner through the use of law. (Major changes are being introduced by means of the law, as with family and domestic violence legislation.)

11)  The media may take a narrow focus, not covering alternative perspectives. (There are examples of this, including uncritical reporting and limited investigative analysis.)

 

3. How does the law fit in?

 

3.1 Vulnerability of the law

 

Stephen Franks recently wrote:

“Lawyers would be shocked by the number of people, including sophisticated community leaders, who tell MPs of suspicions that our Judges succumb to deliberate political pressure…” (Franks 2004, p.12)

 

Some time ago I argued that, in the area of family law, "… the New Zealand legal establishment possesses institutional characteristics which can make it particularly vulnerable to capture by well-positioned parties promoting a particular interest." (Birks 1998, p.1) I support this statement in section 4 of the same paper, , and discuss the matter further in Chapter 5 of Birks (2000).

 

Points raised include:

a)      Deliberation on matters requiring specialist knowledge outside the law.

b)      Recourse to “menus of principles”, whereby criteria can be chosen to support a preferred result.[7]

c)      Legal proof really amounting not to proof, but to persuasion. Can a judge or jury be persuaded to believe one side over the other? Which side presents the most plausible story?

d)      Judges having discretion, and being subject to pressure, or perhaps aspiring to social activism.

e)      The outcome of court action being the result of a “team” effort, with many participants having some influence. Do all participants operate in a satisfactory way? Are they all accountable?[8]

f)        The outcome of court action being process dependent, or dependent on the way in which a case is handled.

g)      Case law setting precedents while being the result of legal action by people with their own objectives, limited budgets and limited consideration of the issues.

 

These characteristics of legal reasoning can allow distortions to occur. Points (b) and (c) in particular mean that legal decisions are not transparent.[9]

 

I will not elaborate on all these points again here, but there are some aspects that merit further attention, as discussed below.

 

3.2 Ethics issues

 

Barristers and Solicitors are guided by the Rules of Professional Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors. A report on legal ethics was written by W Brent Cotter QC and Christopher Roper[10]. The report identified numerous problems with the Rules including:

 

1.    ignorance of them;

2.    a conscious risk-taking to get around them;

3.    perceived inconsistencies in the Rules;

4.    the lack of rigour in enforcing them;

5.    different application according to district;

6.    application with different degrees of rigour over parts of the profession.

 

Sections 2.6 and 10 of the report detailed these matters, giving possible reasons why the current situation has arisen. Section 10.2 described how some lawyers saw themselves not as a profession guided by codes of ethics, but as businesses that are not so constrained. The report’s key proposal was for the coverage of ethics in legal training. This might not be enough.[11] Gordon Marino, writing in the Chronicle of Higher Education, says:

 

Ethics missionaries are driven by the assumption that improving our moral lives is a matter of developing our conceptual understanding and analytical acumen. The fantasy seems to be that if up-and-coming accountants just knew a little more about ethics, then they would know better than to falsify their reports so as to drive up the value of company stock.”  (Marino, 2004)

 

An indication that some ethical checks may currently exist can be found in a recent high-publicity case (although, to be precise, the check was imposed, rather than self-imposed). Venter (2004) reported that Justice Greig had been disqualified from participating further in the case of Ahmed Zaoui. “Justices Harrison and Salmon said Justice Greig’s statements revealed ‘a state of mind arguably antagonistic to Mr Zaoui’ and questioned his independence from Security Intelligence Service director Richard Woods.”

 

This suggests a criterion that could exclude people from acting in certain cases. Are there other people working in the law who have attitudes antagonistic to certain groups? If so, are questions raised about their independence and right to participate? The following section considers the first of these questions, and implicitly answers the second.

 

3.3 Signs of bias and/or ignorance

Only days before the Greig resignation, the incoming Principle Family Court Judge talked of “the unrelenting and unfair criticism of the court” (Taylor 2004). This is interesting in the context of an editorial in the March 2004 issue of the New Zealand Law Journal, which said claims of bias, “are simply dismissed out of hand by the family law lobby with insulting remarks”, and, “In some seminars your editor has attended it has been clear that family law practitioners and relevant officials in the Justice department are simply unwilling or unable to engage in rational analysis”.[12] Judge Boshier’s response (Boshier 2004) included the following comment on the suggestion that the Court operates behind a “veil of secrecy”, “It is such arrant nonsense that regrettably, the whole of the editorial must be seen as misinformed and biased opinion”. While acknowledging the privacy provisions that apply in the Family Court, he considers the Court to be accountable through the High Court, although that is a rarely used option. 

Relatively new sources of information on the thinking of those working in the Family Court are newspaper columns written by Family Court lawyers and the regular monthly column, “Judgements from the Family Court”, written for the Court by Debra Sturm.

 

3.3.1 Example 1

A regular writer is Vivienne Crawshaw. Over three columns she describes a fictitious custody case (Crawshaw 2003a, b and c). The title of the last column, “Shared parenting best for children of failed marriages”, is misleading. A couple with two children separated, but the father continued to be an active parent, having the children after school most days, plus alternate weekends. The children stayed most nights with their mother “because she could not stand to be away from them for more than two days at a time”. When the father formed a new relationship, the mother wanted to move away with the children. She even disappeared with the children for some time. She is shown to be hostile to the children’s ongoing relationship with their father, and frequently cross-examined them about events at the father’s home. A psychologist reported that she was volatile and had difficulty containing her emotions. She was allowed to retain custody, as long as she did not move away. Implicit in the case are presumptions by the mother that she has a right to the children, by the father that his ongoing relationship with the children is tenuous, and by the Court that it is in the best interest of the children that the mother retains custody despite her putting her own needs above those of the children.

 

3.3.2 Example 2

Another lawyer, Susan Bathgate, wrote recently on matters relating to the Nelson case that received much publicity due to the involvement of Nick Smith (Bathgate 2004). She considered that, in some respects, there were similarities with a case she had been involved in. In that case the children were two and six, and, “At that time, I was reluctant to interview children as young as them. I believed they were best assessed by a psychologist who was far better than I at discovering and reporting their needs and desires.” The six-year-old, “insisted on an interview…and announced he was representing the interests of his sister as well as his own...It soon became clear that he, not his mother (as I had supposed), was driving the case.” This begs the question whether he understood the issues and the options. Given that parents are advised not to involve children in adult matters, might one parent have been providing more information than the other, and was the information accurate? More significantly, was the lawyer aware of such things as parental alienation, and could she be certain that it was not occurring in this case? According to Rand, one behaviour associated with parental alienation is, “The child asserts that the decision to reject the target parent is his or her own, what Gardner calls the ‘independent thinker’ phenomenon”.[13]

 

3.3.3 Example 3

In the above example, the writer noted evidence in the Nelson case on the attitude of the boy concerned. She contended that the right decision was reached in the judgements of the High Court and the Family Court at that time. As reported in the New Zealand Herald (Tunnah 2004), a psychiatrist had said, "I've never heard of a little boy who has said, 'My wishes in life are for me to live and my family not to die'. That's very early damage." This was taken as indicative of damage caused to the seven-year-old in the early months of his life. An alternative interpretation could be that the child had been alienated, or, as Rand (op cit.) describes, Borrowed scenarios are present, i.e., the child's statements reflect themes and terminology of the alienating parent”. The article also stated:

 

'Judge Mill said the parents could now offer the boy a home in a safe,
child-focused and stimulating environment. "They are doing nothing wrong. This is one of the most remarkable turnarounds in a family I have seen. The parents are deserving because of what they have achieved."'

 

An alternative interpretation could be that the problems that the family had had earlier were not as serious as had been made out. In other words, had these Judges read the evidence differently, they could have come to the opposite conclusion in the case, while using the same information.

 

3.3.4 Example 4

Debra Sturm provides an example with more of an economics focus in her column (Sturm 2003) for April 2003. She describes a case in which the wife receives $50,000 "compensatory" payment under Section 15 of the Property Relationships Act 1976. Such payments are made if there is significant disparity in income or living standards post-separation “because of the effects of the division of functions within the marriage or de facto relationship while the parties were living together”.[14]

“Jane” had given up her career as a secretary to accompany her husband, “Jim”, on a number of overseas postings. There were no children. While Jim argued that she had enjoyed an “enviable lifestyle” and had enjoyed herself while on the trips, the Judge decided “because giving up career progress had some positive side effects, does not mean it should be discounted." We could wonder about legislation that provides compensation in such circumstances, but the provision is there for judges to apply if they see fit. We could also question whether the Judge in this case was right to determine that compensation should equal the full amount of any post-separation earnings deficiency caused by the disrupted work record. Here I will disregard both these issues, looking instead at the economic decision on the actual sum to be paid.

The $50,000 figure was calculated to make up for $10,000 lower earnings for 5 years. It was the opinion of a recruitment consultant that earnings might be lower for 3-5 years, so 5 was taken, rather than 3 or 4. It is also assumed that the earnings disparity is constant for 5 years, then suddenly disappears, whereas it is more likely that the disparity would fall steadily over the period.

Income is earned over several years, but the compensation is paid now. Future disparities should be discounted to give a present value. Tax is also paid on income, whereas the "compensation" is tax free to the recipient. Calculations should therefore be based on after-tax figures.

To illustrate the effect of these factors, consider an alternative calculation where the disparity erodes evenly over 5 years from an initial $10,000, a marginal tax rate for additional income of 19.5%, and a 3% discount rate for future payments. The actual sum required would be $22,556. In the case of a 33% marginal tax rate, the figure would be $18,773, and if also eroding over only 3 years, the sum would fall to $12,759.

We can see, therefore, that allowing for these three factors can reduce the amount required as a lump-sum compensation to little more than a quarter of the amount determined by the Judge. It does not stop there, however. The Judge could also decide from where the money was to come. As Sturm reports, “The payment is ‘compensatory’, so the entire amount was paid from the husband’s already divided share of the relationship property”. On that interpretation of the term “compensatory”, the actual difference in allocations due to the "compensation" is doubled to $100,000. This is despite the Judge stating that the payment is “to compensate for what happens during co-habitation” – namely Jane’s lower post-separation income resulting from the “division of functions” during the marriage. Incidentally, as Jim was the sole income earner on a good salary, this sum would probably have been obtained from $164,000 of income taxed at the top marginal tax rate of 39 percent.

 

3.3.5 Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is a recurring theme in family law. Not only is it an issue in itself, but it is a factor influencing debate, policy and decisions in relation to family stability, custody and access, and even relationship property and child support. It also has wider significance in terms of objectives in the areas of education and work.

 

Law Society figures for May 1997 show that, of the lawyers spending more than 25 percent of their time on family law work, 55 percent were women.[15] The Women’s Consultative Group of the New Zealand Law Society made a submission to the Law Commission dated 8 November 2000 on Preliminary Paper 41, Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who Offend. It included the assertion, At the heart of the current law on domestic violence in New Zealand, as embodied in the Domestic Violence Act 1995, lies a very simple concept: domestic violence is about the use of power by men to control their women partners” (my emphasis). Commonly known as the Duluth model, it is only one perspective on domestic violence. It is presented by this group as the only valid perspective. It does not explain women’s violence against men and children, and may not adequately explain violence by men or mutual partner violence. It is hard to see how this group could represent male clients whose female partners had been violent to them, or children whose mothers had been violent. To refer back to the issue of ethics and Judge Greig, should these women be disqualified from participating in cases due to their antagonistic attitudes?

 

It has taken some time, but some judges have begun suggesting that there may be other explanations of violence, most recently, Judge Doogue (Doogue 2004). She says, “In my experience and that of other Judges this model does not fit the profile of many cases coming before the Family Court in New Zealand. She continues, “…the time has come to review the social experimentation arising and the effects and implications of the legislation” (my emphasis). We could ask why legislation was introduced, and then kept in place for nearly ten years, if it was social experimentation based on an overly restricted and specifically gendered understanding of the nature of domestic violence. While Judge Doogue attempts to take a broader approach, she only makes a brief mention of mutual violence. She is actually dismissive of the problem that “the Court cannot technically allow unsupervised contact (custody or access) with either parent”, saying, “it would be clearly inappropriate and unnecessary to remove children from the care of both parents pending consideration and resolution of [the legal] issues”. If this is the case, we could ask why is it appropriate and necessary to remove one parent, especially when it can mean that “women are the arbiters of access that men have to their children and…in some cases the temporary protection order is in fact used as a ‘weapon’ against the father”.

 

Judge Doogue refers to five types of inter-parental violence identified as early as 1993 (before the passing of the Domestic Violence Act):

1)      ongoing episodes of male battering characterised by assaults from early in the relationship, accompanied by denial, or a minimisation of the violence, or blaming the partner for causing it;

2)      female-initiated violence involving physical aggression;

3)      inter-active violence…mutual abuse and physical struggles finally dominated by the male;

4)      separation engendered…uncharacteristic acts of violence…unlikely to continue;

5)      a few exceptional cases where dementia or psychosis combined with separation triggered aggressive and dangerous behaviour.

Even the first three of these can be considered to incorporate gender-asymmetry and gender-political assumptions and terminology.

 

There would appear to be evidence of weaknesses within the law, but what of the wider context?

 


3. 4 Law in a wider context

 

3.4.1 Law and Politics

Stephen Franks referred to Judges being susceptible to political pressure, but this does not necessarily mean pressure from MPs. They could be reacting to pressure from lobby groups, for example. Judge Doogue’s paper may even be an illustration of that. She says, “It is incumbent on the legal community not to dismiss the views of critics of the [domestic violence] legislation because they appear in some instances to be so extreme”. We could ask why it took extreme behaviour for her to suggest that it should be reviewed. Logical argument had been used before, but, as Bernard Robertson pointed out, it was ignored by the “family law lobby”. Perhaps it was other lobby groups that led to the current approach to domestic violence in the first place.

 

Appendix 2 includes extracts from a brochure on the Ministry of Justice web site entitled "Dealing with domestic violence: Information on protection orders and the Domestic Violence Act" (Ministry of Justice, undated). It is aimed at the general public and describes how the legislation works. It is worth considering in terms of the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty.

 

The document shows that violence is very broadly defined, and includes psychological violence such as humiliating someone, or "controlling their money, time, car, or contact with friends". It states that a Judge will usually make a decision without seeing the applicant, and without the respondent being aware of the proceedings. If the Judge is satisfied with this evidence, a Protection Order will be made immediately.

 
An agent of the Court (usually a bailiff, perhaps with the Police) will visit the respondent and give them a copy of the Protection Order.  The respondent may be required to move out of the home.

 
The Protection Order initially lasts for three months. If not defended, it then becomes permanent. It will include non-contact conditions with the applicant and any children (including phone, letter, fax, etc.) which the respondent must always follow. The applicant can agree to contact, but can reinstate the non-contact conditions at will without going to Court.

 

Where there is evidence that a breach of a Protection Order has occurred (which could mean sending a birthday card to a child, or failing to attend a Stopping Violence programme), the document states that the person will be arrested and cannot be bailed by the Police for 24 hours.

 

In other words, it is possible to have someone evicted from his home and denied contact with his children on the basis of only a written submission.

 

In the context of this paper, we should also note that the legislation is set and interpreted in the context of a highly gendered view of domestic violence, despite evidence that this is overly restrictive. We could ask how politicians could pass such a law, and lawyers and judges can apply the law for a period of years, without questioning whether it goes against fundamental principles of a democratic society.

 

3.4.2 The Shadow of the Law

Another area where lawyers and politicians have taken a similar, but questionable stance is in relation to family law and the “shadow of the law”. The Family Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society demonstrates apparent ignorance of the shadow of the law in a media release of 26 April 2000 on the Shared Parenting Bill (NZLS 2000), stating:

 

"...the Bill seems to ignore the fact that the vast majority of parents seem to be able to find sensible and pragmatic solutions to the problems posed by family separation without resort either to lawyers or the courts. The Section is concerned that substantive law changes are being promoted as a response to a relatively small number of difficult cases."

 

On 10 May 2000 the New Zealand parliament defeated the Shared Parenting Bill, a private members bill, at its first reading. The government case against the Bill was based on objections raised in a briefing paper by the Ministry of Women's Affairs. The paper included the following statement:

 

"…the current system … appears to work well for the majority of cases. In fact, it appears that only 5% of custody applications to the Family Court result in contested hearings."

 

The implication in both of these documents is that those who do not take the matter to a hearing are happy with the result.

 

More commonly, economists and lawyers are likely to recognize that people operate in “the shadow of the law”. In other words, existing laws as they are applied shape their environment and affect behaviour. For example, people may agree to outcomes on the basis that they would do no better going through the court, even if they do not consider it appropriate or fair.

 

In economics, it is commonly assumed (not entirely unrealistically) that people are law-abiding, and regulations with be followed. Judges have been known to be influenced in their decisions according to whether there is a need to “send a signal” to people as to what is acceptable behaviour. In fact, if there were no effect from the shadow of the law, enforcement costs would be prohibitive, and most laws would be ineffective. We would have to wonder whether lawyers and politicians are being deliberately blinkered in this case when they deny that such an effect exists.

 

3.4.3 Judicial Activism

Traditionally a central component of democracy is that laws are made by elected representatives, and implemented by the judiciary, with neither impinging on the other. Where judges move beyond interpretation of existing law into effectively making new law, it is termed judicial activism. To quote again from Taylor (2004), Judge Boshier defended the court against criticism, and batted responsibility towards politicians. He said the court was following Parliament's will…” This is surprising. Judge Boshier has made his position clear on judicial activism, having written a Family Law Journal editorial on the subject (Boshier 1999). In it, he referred to a paper he had presented to the 1998 Family Law Conference (Boshier 1998). It had received publicity, especially as it amounted to judge-initiated debate on the law. Calling for creative interpretation of matrimonial property legislation, he said, “This will of course involve social policy issues. After all, what would the public rather have: a statute firmly set in the social mores of the 1970s or a statute that lives and evolves with our society? Law does not exist in a vacuum, but is an evolutionary process. Development of the law is dependent on counsel being prepared to push boundaries, and challenge judges to find ways to flesh the bones of the Act and do justice to all parties." (pp.58-9)

 

Family law is not the only area where judicial activism may be occurring. On 24 May 2004 Parliament celebrated its 150th year of existence. There was a special session to mark that milestone, during which many speeches focused on the significance and role of parliament, and on threats to democracy. Politicians on both sides of the House made reference to judicial activism, some stating explicitly that this was a serious threat. Extracts can be found in Appendix 3. Hon Michael Cullen went so far as to say, “It is almost as if there is an emerging view that sovereignty is to be shared between Parliament and the judiciary, with Parliament being the junior and less-informed partner.”

 

3.4.4 Media and Information

Zonta describes itself as, "A worldwide service organisation of executives in business and the professions working together to advance the status of women". On the web page of the New Zealand branch of Zonta there is a section on advocacy.[16] It includes an extract from a speech given to Zonta International on 26 May 2002 by Patricia Schnauer Barrister and Solicitor and MP in first MMP Government. She gave advice on “Influencing and changing the system”, including the following:

 

“…if you have established a good reputation for your organisation;  if you are respected for the work you do in the community; if what your organisation has said on previous campaigns and on previous issues has been sensible and respected;  then when you come to speak on an individual or new issue, people will listen to you.

 

Building credibility; building a good reputation based on common sense and well researched positions; building a reputation for being an organisation which does good work in the community – result in your being well received and listened to."

 

This group had a speaker, Los Angeles deputy city attorney Alana Bowman, for its International Woman's Day breakfast in Palmerston North. Her message was an attack on society's "embedded and systematic violence against women" and included the claim that, in NZ, "97 percent of the victims of domestic violence are women". Far from presenting a well-researched position, this figure is clearly wrong. It raises questions about both the speaker and about the organization. Moreover, the talk raises issues about the media in that it was reported in the local paper uncritically and without any balancing information (Matthews 2004). In a “free country”, people are free to express their opinions. In a healthy society, the environment should be such that responsible people and organizations would ensure that their opinions are supported by evidence, and would know that statements that are contrary to the evidence would be challenged.

 

4 What does this have to do with economics and democracy?

 

So far, relatively little has been said about the economics dimension, but it is also highly significant. For example, at the specific level, activism on domestic violence is closely entwined with the arguments for economic policies in relation to work and gender, and family law.

 

More generally, the policymaking and implementation weaknesses that have been identified in this paper in relation to law may also apply in other areas where the law is used to address matters with significant economic implications. Some areas immediately spring to mind: the Resource Management Act; pay equity; and issues in relation to Maori.

 

Economic theory recognises that imperfect and asymmetric information can cause market failure. The examples in this paper illustrate that imperfect and asymmetric information can also be a cause of institutional and public sector failure. This is not a minor concern. To quote Dr Lockwood Smith from Hansard of 24 May 2004:

“It troubles me that in my 20 years in this Parliament, we have passed 2,938 bills, and respective Governments have promulgated 7,636 new regulations.”

 

At a broader level still, democratic systems are complex, and they can display weaknesses. The law is one of the central components of a democratic society. How well the law functions is important because of its widespread implications. From an economics perspective, questions include:

  • How are policies (including economic policies) implemented in practice?
  • Who is formulating policy?
  • Are policy makers and implementers accountable?
  • How are public preferences expressed, and are these preferences taken into account?
  • How efficiently are legal matters handled?
  • What are the wider incentives arising from the law, and how do people respond to these incentives?
  • What are the long-term implications of current experience, in so far as it shapes the attitudes, expectations and understanding of future generations?

 

Frequently, matters are considered in terms of an individual case, or a narrow issue. If there is to be one single point to take from Haffner’s book, it is that it is important, at least occasionally, to step back and consider a broader perspective.

 


Appendix 1

 

Lessons from Haffner

 

1) There can be hidden threats to democracy, with individuals fighting battles in isolation:

 

“Thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of such duels, in which an individual tries to defend his integrity and his personal honour against a formidably hostile state, have been fought in Germany during the last six years. Each is waged in total isolation and out of public view.” (p.4)

 

2) It can be harder to understand the wider significance of things that are more personally immediate:

 

“What is more, as events impinged on us more closely, they became much more obscure and less intelligible than before, when they had taken place in distant France and had been placed in their proper perspective by the daily army bulletin. At times one heard shots fired every day, but one rarely found out why.” (p.27)

 

3) Can people recognise when major changes are occurring? Some significant events occur where “life goes on as normal”, others more dramatic. Major events can be obscured by activities of everyday life. Some “historical” events have little impact on individuals. Some significant events might not be highlighted in history:

 

“Life went on as before. No family was torn apart, no friendship broke up, no one fled their country.” (p.6)

 

“All this was still something one only read about in the press. You did not see or hear anything that was any different from what had gone on before. There were brown SA uniforms on the streets, demonstrations, shouts of 'Heil', but otherwise it was 'business as usual'.” (p.91)

 

“Daily life also made it difficult to see the situation clearly. Life went on as before…” (p.113)

 

“…it is typical of the early years of the Nazi regime that the whole façade of everyday life remained virtually unchanged.” (p.127)

 

The point about individuals’ perceptions of events in made in several places through the book. In particular, the point is made that ongoing aspects of normal, everyday life can prevent both the recognition of major changes and the emergence of effective opposition to those changes. As for events where families are torn apart, friendships broken, and people flee the country, should the current pattern of widespread separation and divorce, whereby a third of children are not living with both their parents, be considered a momentous historical event?

 

4) With the 1923 hyperinflation, past experience counted for nothing: “…the failure of all the rules of life and the bankruptcy of age and experience. (p.51) The younger generation may think that such knowledge and experience are no longer relevant or useful:

 

“In that year an entire generation of Germans had a spiritual organ removed: the organ which gives men steadfastness and balance, but also a certain inertia and stolidity. It may variously appear as conscience, reason, experience, respect for the law, morality, or the fear of God. A whole generation learned then - or thought it learned - to do without such ballast.” (p.44)

 

“It was a situation in which mental inertia and reliance on past experience was punished by starvation and death, but rapid appraisal of new situations and speed of reaction was rewarded with sudden, vast riches. The twenty-one-year-old bank director appeared on the scene, and also the sixth-former who earned his living from the stock-market tips of his slightly older friends. He wore Oscar Wilde ties, organised champagne parties, and supported his embarrassed father.” (p.47)

 

“…the daily spectacle of the failure of all the rules of life and the bankruptcy of age and experience.” (p.51)

 

5) There can be subtle influences on the attitudes and illusions of children which only have an impact on society 20 or so years later:

 

“A childish illusion, fixed in the minds of all children born in a certain decade and hammered home for four years, can easily reappear as a deadly serious political ideology twenty years later.” (p.15)

 

“What 'every child knows' is generally the last irrefutable quintessence of a political development.” (pp.26-7)

 

While on a different scale, there is a greater immediacy with feminism, whereby a boy aspiring to be a doctor is simply working towards a career, whereas a girl with a similar goal can consider herself to be trailblazing for women everywhere. The implications of this difference in perception have not, to my knowledge, been analysed.

 

6) It may have been significant that a generation grew up without strong family life and fixed customs and traditions:

 

On the appreciation of culture, informed discussion, and, ”last but not least, an intense, intimate family life. Almost all of this had fallen into ruin and decay in the decade from 1914 to 1924 and the younger generation had grown up without fixed customs and traditions.” (p.58)

 

It is perhaps not clear what future young men and women in New Zealand envision for themselves, save that it is unlikely to match the traditional view. It is equally unclear what future lives the government envisions for these young people, save in relation to women’s “economic independence” and “work/life balance”.

 

7) If a government compromises fundamental democratic principles, then democracy is devalued and can lose support:

 

On the Bruning government that came to power in 1930:

 

“To my knowledge, the Bruning regime was the first essay and model of a form of government that has since been copied in many European countries: the semi-dictatorship in the name, and in defence, of democracy against fully-fledged dictatorship... the inevitable forerunner of the very thing it is supposed to prevent: its discouragement of its own supporters; the way it undermines its own position; its acceptance of a loss of freedom; its lack of ideological weapons against enemy propaganda; the way it surrenders the initiative; and its collapse at the final moment when the issue is reduced to a simple question of power.” (p.72)

 

In other words, a democracy can debase itself to the point where it loses popular support and is no longer valued. This occurs through diluting democratic principles. Is this currently occurring with domestic violence legislation, and policies affecting human rights, privacy, state interference in personal lives?

 

It can be hard to counter such dilution because people may realize too late what is happening or being promoted. Consider the acceptance of biased approaches in gender analysis, and in the distorted assessments and Duluth-type gendered interpretations of, and policies on, family violence. Similarly, what is the significance of shifts in family law in relation to “relationship property” settlements? What of moves from “equal pay for equal work” to “equal pay for work of equal value”, and on to “equal outcomes” for women? How about the undermining of concepts of the family through greater emphasis on “sole parent families” (as if the other parent does not exist), a “diversity of family types”, and the key role of “economic autonomy for women” in the government’s Action Plan for Women. Have these changes been based on and supported by balanced research, or on dubious reasoning and evidence?

 

8) People are commonly prepared to handle the problems of the previous generation, and this may result in their being constrained or blinkered as to what might occur:

 

“I had all the intellectual endowments to play a decent part in the bourgeois world of the period before 1914…At best I smelled a warning whiff of what was about to confront me, but I did not have an intellectual system that would help me deal with it.

 

True, that was not just my situation but that of my whole generation, and even more the situation of the older generation…Our thinking is usually constrained by a certain civilisation in our outlook, in which the basics are unquestioned - and so implicit that they are almost forgotten.”  (p.85)

 

“At the time, while I experienced them, it was not possible to gauge their significance…In spite of all our historical and cultural education, how completely helpless we were to deal with something that just did not feature in anything we had learned!” (p.113)

 

Are our young being educated for an environment that is no more, or the society that will exist in the future, or according to some quite different agenda (such as the society that some might want to exist, whether feasible or not, or generally agreed or not)?

 

9) When a group is attacked, attention may then be focused on that group, rather than on those making the threat:

 

“By publicly threatening a person, an ethnic group, a nation, or a region, with death and destruction, they provoke a general discussion not about their own existence, but about the right of their victims to exist. In this way that right is put in question.” (p.117)

 

This highlights the significance of the choice of question. Having identified men as violent, and then defined “sole-parent families”, we debate whether it could be justified to move towards shared parenting, given that this might enable men to perpetuate their abuses and continue to exercise power and control over the mothers of their children. In the debate, it is not necessary to justify exclusion of fathers, or permitted to question the inclusion of mothers. Nor is it questioned why certain groups are hostile to the participation of fathers. Rather, the debate is on whether it is possible to justify the reintroduction of basic rights for fathers and children that have, without debate, been withdrawn.

 

10) Major changes, even if contrary to fundamental principles, can occur in an orderly manner through the use of law:

 

“The Gleichschaltung — placing Nazis in controlling positions of all ministries, local agencies, boards of large companies, commit­tees of associations - continued, but it now took a pedantic, orderly form with laws and regulations...Jewish civil servants, doctors, lawyers and journalists were still dismissed, but now it happened legally and in an orderly fashion, by paragraph such-and-such of the Civil Code.” (p.156)

 

11) The media may take a narrow focus, not covering alternative perspectives:

 

As Haffner describes it, the German experience was marked:

 

“In a way a newspaper is like an old acquaintance: you instinctively know how it will react to certain events, what it will say about them and how it will express its views. If it suddenly says the opposite of what it said yesterday, denies its own past, distorting its features, you cannot avoid feeling that you are in a madhouse. That happened.” (p.163)

 

Gradual change is less noticeable, but can be just as significant. At the same time, such a gradual change may arise simply as a result of newspapers reflecting the views and concerns of the day. However, the question remains, how well do the media inform the public on matters that affect them?


 

Appendix 2

 

Dealing with domestic violence

 

There is a New Zealand Ministry of Justice publication called Dealing with domestic violence: Information on protection orders and the Domestic Violence Act. [17] Here are some extracts:

 

What does the law mean by “domestic violence”?

 

Domestic violence is not only a fist in the face or a kick in the head. The law says that violence can be physical, sexual, or psychological.

 

Physical abuse. Nobody – including a husband, wife, partner, or an adult who looks after children – has the right to hit, punch, kick, or in any way assault another person.

 

Sexual abuse. Nobody is allowed to have sexual contact with another person without that person’s permission.

 

Psychological abuse. This includes intimidation, threats, and mind games.

 

Some of the things the Family Court recognises as psychological abuse are:

  • damaging property as a way of hurting someone
  • making threats, such as “If you leave, I’ll kill you”, “Do that again and I’ll give you a hiding”, “Tell the Police and I’ll beat up the kids”
  • allowing a child to see or hear domestic violence
  • trying to control someone’s life by constantly humiliating them
  • controlling someone’s money, time, car, or contact with friends as a way of having power over them.

 

When someone makes an application for a protection order:

 

Usually, the Judge will not need to see you in Court before making a decision on your application. However, sometimes the Judge will ask to see you (with your lawyer or others who are helping).

 

Most of the Protection Orders made by the Family Court are made immediately and “without notice” – which means the person the Protection Order is taken out against (the respondent) is not aware of it.

 

In other circumstances, the Judge will direct that the application will be heard “on notice” – this means that both parties will have the opportunity to be heard by the Court. If this happens, the Judge will normally give the respondent a short period of time (say 24 hours or a few days at most) to file a written defence. If a defence is filed, the Court will then hear each side and make a decision.

 

Will the respondent be present in the Court?

Not usually. All applications are initially considered without a hearing. Where a Judge is satisfied on the evidence given in the affidavit that a Protection Order is justified, it will be made immediately.

 

Once the order is granted:

 

Once the Order is granted, things happen quickly. The Orders are usually typed up at the Court and copies are made... An agent of the Court (usually a bailiff, perhaps with the Police) will visit the respondent and give them a copy of the Protection Order.

When a Protection Order is made before the respondent is given notice, it is temporary and lasts for three months. If the respondent does not defend it, the Order will automatically become final after the three months is up, and will stay in force permanently until the Order is discharged.

 

The Order will include non-contact conditions which the respondent must always follow. However, you can agree to contact. Standard non-contact conditions include that the respondent must not:

 

  • come to your home or onto your property
  • hang around the neighbourhood
  • try to stop you, your children, or those close to you from coming or going
  • phone, write or fax, or in any way contact you or your children unless it is an emergency, or there is written permission, or both sides are asked to attend a family group conference.

 

Non-violence conditions apply in every case. Non-contact conditions apply when the parties are living apart.

 

If you are named in a Protection Order, the consequences could be very serious. It will affect the contact you have with your partner and your children, if you have any. In some cases, it may mean you have to move out of the house. In other cases, it may mean that your partner or family member can take furniture from the house...

 

If you are the applicant


Contact with respondent

If you want to have contact with the respondent - for example, if you want to continue living together – you can suspend the non-contact conditions, so they don’t apply. You can withdraw your consent to have contact with the respondent at any time, and the conditions are reinstated automatically. You do not have to go to Court to do this.

 

 

Do I have to move out of home?

No. One of the real fears people have about standing up to violence is that they will end up with nowhere to live. Talk to your lawyer about whether you need to get a Property Order in addition to the Protection Order so you can stay in your home.


Do I lose all my furniture if I decide not to go back to the house?

No. If you move out of your home because of violence, you can get a Furniture Order. This means that you can take furniture from your old home to set up a new home. The Police can be asked to accompany you to collect the furniture.

 

Who will get custody of the children?

When there is proven violence, the Court will usually not allow the violent person to have custody unless the Court is satisfied the children will be safe.

 

Will the respondent be able to visit the children?

A Custody or Access Order issued by the Court will say when visits can occur. When there is proven violence, the Court will usually not allow the violent person to have unsupervised access to children, unless the Court is satisfied the children will be safe. Any costs of providing supervised access are to be paid by the person seeking access.
If a parent can only have supervised access to the children, it is very important to tell the school, day care centre and other caregivers about the Order and exactly who is allowed to visit or take the children away.

 

(Note that this restriction on custody and unsupervised access is likely to be applied "conservatively", i.e. safety will not be readily assumed. [18] Note also that, in an American study, Straus [19] found: "Of the 495 couples in [the survey] for whom one or more assaultive incidents were reported by a woman respondent, the husband was the only violent partner in 25.9% of the cases, the wife was the only one to be violent in 25.5% of the cases, and both were violent in 48.6% of the cases.")

 

If you give it another chance and the violence starts again, you don’t need to go back to Court - simply tell your partner that the non-contact conditions are on again (the non-violence ones can never be suspended). All the original conditions immediately come back into force and the abuser must immediately leave you alone.

 

If you have a Protection Order, you have specific protection from any physical, sexual or psychological abuse (and that includes threats or harassment). The Police policy is to arrest a person who breaches a Protection Order. The person will then be dealt with in a criminal Court, not the Family Court.

 

 

What are the penalties for breaches of a Protection Order?

Where there is evidence that a breach of a Protection Order has occurred, the person will be arrested and cannot be bailed by the Police for 24 hours. The Court will give the highest priority to the victim’s safety when considering bail applications.
The maximum penalty for breach of a Protection Order is six months in prison or a $5000 fine. The penalty increases to two years in prison where a person is convicted of three offences, and two of those are committed within a three year period. If other serious crimes of violence are involved, the penalties could be even more severe. A breach includes failing to attend a Stopping Violence programme.


Appendix 3

 

Extracts from Hansard, Monday, 24 May 2004

150th Anniversary Sitting of Parliament

 

Perhaps surprisingly, several MPs made statements about judicial activism as a threat to democracy. One of the strongest was by Michael Cullen:

 

Hon Dr MICHAEL CULLEN (Deputy Prime Minister):

“…it would now seem to be settled doctrine that New Zealand is a sovereign State in which sovereignty is exercised by Parliament as the supreme maker of law, the highest expression of the will of the governed, and the body to which the Government of the day is accountable.

There is an increasing tendency to challenge the exercise of this sovereignty. This comes not just from some radical Māori, who argue that sovereignty has never been legally acquired in New Zealand; it also comes from within the heart of New Zealand’s judiciary. Our own Chief Justice has put it in three key statements. Firstly, we have assumed the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand—why, is not clear. Secondly, whether there are limits to the lawmaking power of the New Zealand Parliament has not been authoritatively determined, which raises the interesting question of who has the authority to determine that. Thirdly, an untrammelled freedom of Parliament does not exist.”

 

“Judges are not accountable; they are, in fact, independent, and that is essential to their role in society. Independence and accountability are two things that cannot be easily mixed. We need the judges’ impartial rulings on what the law says and how it applies in individual cases, but if they then begin to express views on what the law should be, or on what it says, they enter dangerous territory. It is dangerous not only for the case at hand but also because it means that the public begins to perceive the judiciary as politicised—even more so when decisions run counter to the original intent of the law, or regard statutes as not much more than imprecise guides to action. If, as a nation, we want to go down that track, we may have to consider the broader issues of an entrenched higher law, a clearer separation of powers in the constitution, and other constitutional issues.”

 

“Activism does not always challenge parliamentary sovereignty, but it often does. And in New Zealand fundamental questions have been raised about that sovereignty. It is almost as if there is an emerging view that sovereignty is to be shared between Parliament and the judiciary, with Parliament being the junior and less-informed partner. That is so because where Parliament’s sovereignty is questioned it is usually accompanied by the assertion or implication that it is the courts that have the final say as to the rules.”

 

Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT):

There are a number of threats, and one of those threats is the power of unelected judges to make judge-made law…

Hon BILL ENGLISH (National—Clutha-Southland):

 “Parliament has created the opportunity for judicial activism by not taking the responsibility that only a sovereign Parliament should take, which is to define the meaning of citizenship and to define the role of the treaty. The courts have filled that gap.”

 

“When reflecting on the level of debate and consideration of our legislation in this House, I decided, by way of comparison, to look at Lord Cooke’s historic judgment setting out the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. I found that, compared with parliamentary debate, the reasoning was weak and the judgment was partial. It took some words in a narrow context and generalised them to the broadest possible context, in a way that this Parliament would certainly debate vigorously if an MP, a Minister, or a Prime Minister proceeded in the same way.”

 

Peter Dunne voiced a general concern for the balancing of powers:

 

Hon PETER DUNNE (Leader—United Future):

I think therefore that it is appropriate that in the wider community at the moment we are starting to embark upon a broad debate about the future of our constitution, about the role of our Parliament, about where the Treaty of Waitangi fits, about the relevance of our institutions, about the relationships between our executive, our legislative, and our judicial branches, and about our status as a constitutional monarchy.

 

…and Bill English and Richard Prebble raised specific concerns:

 

Hon BILL ENGLISH (National—Clutha-Southland):

“…we have, even in the term of this Parliament, seen two examples of the executive attempting to fashion this institution to its means, and we see attacks on things that we do not realise are important until they are attacked... The point is simply that the price of the freedoms we have is eternal vigilance.”

 

Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT):

“A bigger threat to Parliament and democracy [than judicial activism] comes from the unfettered power of Prime Ministers to turn back-benchers—the guardians of parliamentary democracy—into Ministers.

We all know that a country of 4 million people does not need 28 Ministers…Prime Ministers create Ministers in order to dominate, first, their own party caucuses, and then this House. It is a power play to dominate this House, and it has been very successful…To increase their power, Prime Ministers have waved the prospect of office before MPs. The result is that the executive has slowly stripped the rights of members and hobbled their ability to represent rigorously the people we are elected to argue on behalf of.”

 


But there are some positive features:

 

Hon RICHARD PREBBLE (Leader—ACT):

“Now, thanks to MMP and the presence of third parties, no issue of importance to the electorate is ignored, and if there is a viewpoint out there in the community, there is now some party in Parliament to represent it.”

 

“I believe that our select committee process, which enables the public to make submissions on legislation, is the best in the Commonwealth.”

 

Hon PETE HODGSON (Minister of Energy):

“The next feature of our parliamentary system that I think is worthy of some mention is our select committee process, which is somewhat more open, engaged, and effective in our democracy than in most. The Prime Minister spoke of the Palmer reforms, but since MMP the role of a select committee has become more important still—either in its legislative or its inquiry function…Parliamentarians are in this regard more empowered; so is the public. In New Zealand a good argument from a member of the public can, and does, change law.”

 


References

 

Bathgate S (2004) “Stop the warring factions for the sake of the children”, New Zealand Herald, May 18, p.A13

 

Birks S (1998) Gender Analysis and the Women’s Access to Justice Project, Issues Paper No.2, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Palmerston North, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/papers/cppeip02.pdf

 

Birks S (ed.) (2000) Analytical Skills for Social Issues: Reason or Delusion? Issues Paper No.8, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Palmerston North, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/papers/cppeip08/cppeip08.pdf

 

Birks S (2003a) “Aggregation, bias and confusion – distortions in policy”, chapter 3 of Birks S (ed.) (2003) Economics and Policy -  Worlds Apart?, Issues Paper No.14, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Palmerston North, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/papers/cppeip14/cppeip14.pdf

 

Birks S (2003b) “Evidence of Gender Bias in Family Law?”, New Zealand Law Journal, June, 190-1

 

Boshier P (1998) "Developments in Matrimonial Property Law", Family Law Conference, 31st August – 2nd September 1998, Christchurch, New Zealand Law Society, pp.51-69.

 

Boshier P F (1999) "Editorial: Judicial activism and law reform", Butterworths Family Law Journal, September, pp.51-52

 

Boshier P (2004) “Letter to the editor”, The New Zealand Law Journal, May, p.146.

 

Cotter B and Roper C (undated, but released in 1997) Report on a project on  Education and Training in Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility for the Council of Legal Education and the New Zealand Law Society

 

Crawshaw V (2003a) “Boys caught up in tug-of-love”, New Zealand Herald, October 15, p.A21

 

Crawshaw V (2003b) “Children pushed and pulled in two directions”, New Zealand Herald, October 29, p.A20

 

Crawshaw V (2003c) “Shared parenting best for children of failed marriages”, New Zealand Herald, November 12, p.A24

 

Doogue J (2004) “Domestic Violence: Reviewing the Needs of Children”, http://www.lexisnexis.com.au/nz/conferences/seminars/papers/2004/JudgeJanDoogue.pdf

 

Franks S (2004) “Political criticism of Judges”, New Zealand Law Journal, February, pp.11-13

 

Haffner S (2002) Defying Hitler: a memoir, London: Phoenix

 

Marino G (2004) “Before Teaching Ethics, Stop Kidding Yourself”, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Chronicle Education Review, February 20, http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i24/24b00501.htm

 

Matthews L (2004) “Halting violence ‘a job for everyone’”, Manawatu Evening Standard, 9 March, p.3

 

Ministry of Justice (undated) Dealing with domestic violence: Information on protection orders and the Domestic Violence Act, http://www.courts.govt.nz/family/brochures/Domestic_Violence.pdf

 

NZLS (1999) Women’s Access to Legal Services, Study Paper No.1, (NZLS SP1), New Zealand Law Society,

http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publications/NZLCSP1.pdf

 

NZLS (2000) Media release – Shared Parenting Bill, Family Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society, 26 April

 

“No more nine-to-five” Massey News, 24 May 2004, p.4

http://masseynews.massey.ac.nz/2004/Massey_News/may/may24/stories/06-08-04.html

 

Rand D C (1997) "The Spectrum of Parental Alienation Syndrome (Part I)", American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 15(3), pp.23-52.

 

Roberston B (2004) “Editorial - The Family Court”, New Zealand Law Journal, March, p.49

 

Rules of Professional Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/about/profcon.htm

 

Sturm D (2003), “Wife gets $50,000 for uneven split”, Dominion Post, 24 April, p.B5. Also at: “Judgments from the Family Court – April 2003”

 http://www.courts.govt.nz/family/columns/column14.html (accessed 8 June 2004)

 

Taylor P (2004) “End secrecy, says Family Court chief”, New Zealand Herald, 27 March, p.A1

 

Tunnah H (2004) “Custody-row parents lose legal fight”, New Zealand Herald, 14 May, p.A4

 

Venter N (2004), “Now it's 'outski' for Justice Greig”, Dominion Post, 1 April, p.1

 

Women’s Consultative Group of the New Zealand Law Society (2000) Submission to the Law Commission on Preliminary Paper 41, Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who Offend,

http://www.lawyers.org.nz/wcg/submissions/battered_defendants.htm

 

Yates S “The assault on logic”, http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/Yates.pdf (accessed 8 June 2004)

 

Zonta http://www.zonta.org.nz/status2.asp (accessed 11 June 2004)

 

 

Cases cited:

 

Logan v Robertson (1995, NZFLR 711)

 

Nichols v Nichols (1996, NZFLR 311)

 



[1] Haffner S (2002)

[2]  “No more nine-to-five” (2004)

[3]   See, for example, Yates (www.mises.org)

[4]  Maori experience may be radically different – in fact, if such things are considered so important for Maori, why are they so devalued for the population of European origin?

[5]  See below and Appendix 2 on domestic violence. Social engineering can be observed in changing definitions of the family, legislation on de facto and same sex relationships, public sector pay equity policies, etc..

[6]  See, for example, Birks (2003a). Another government body with the specific aim of furthering the interests of women is the National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women. Its membership is mainly ministerial appointees, and its policy direction is clearly gender-focused. See: http://www.nacew.govt.nz/

 

[7]  For example, in Logan v Robertson (1995, NZFLR 711) late submission of a husband's affidavit was not permitted because "the directions of the Court were not to be treated as non-binding guidelines". In Nichols v Nichols (1996, NZFLR 311) the same judge allowed late submission on the grounds that "an injustice could have been done to the wife if she had been unable to have the affidavits introduced".

[8]  For example, Family Court counselling co-ordinators can have a lot of influence, but may be less subject to scrutiny than members of professional bodies.

[9]  This point is further indicated in Roberston (2004), “As all litigators know, judgments bear varying degrees of connection with the matters argued.”

[10] Cotter and Roper (1997)

[11] A new complaints procedure is proposed under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Bill, currently under consideration, and  for which the select committee report is due on 28 June 2004.

[12] Robertson (2004). For further discussion of bias in the Family Court, see Birks (2003b).

[13] This and other behaviours are described on pp.27-8 of Rand (1997).

[14] Property (Relationships) Act 1976, Section 15 (1)

[15] Para.374 of NZLS (1999)

[18] The opinion of the then Principle Family Court Judge, Patrick Mahony, as described by Judge D R Brown in, "Domestic Violence and Children on the Eve of the Domestic Violence Act", a paper presented at the New Zealand Law Society Family Law Conference, Wellington, October 1995

[19] P.74 of Straus MA (1993) "Physical Assaults by Wives: A Major Social Problem", Chapter 4 of Gelles RJ and Loseke DR (eds) (1993) Current Controversies on Family Violence, London: Sage