30 November 2000

 

 

SUBMISSION

 

To the Ministry of Justice on the Review of the Laws About Guardianship, Custody and Access

 

Introduction

 

1.      This submission is from Stuart Birks, Director, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Private Bag 11222, Palmerston North

 

2.      The objective of the Centre for Public Policy Evaluation is “To facilitate the achievement of excellence in research in priority areas and to develop its domestic and international links. The focus will be on economic aspects of policies in a multidisciplinary context.” The work of the Centre has included, among other things, research and publications in the areas of family law and law and economics.

 

3.      Given the nature of my Centre, this submission will focus more on the nature of the review process and the policy environment than on specific recommendations.

 

Misinformation

 

4.      The discussion paper, Responsibilities for Children, Especially when parents part, raises some useful questions, but it also includes information which is likely to have an influence on submissions. This information is misleading. Here I discuss two statements in the paper’s Appendix 1 about the situation in the United States, and omissions from Appendix 2 on international obligations.

 

Hardcastle on joint custody

 

5.      Appendix 1 of the discussion paper is claimed to give overseas examples of laws “which may provide some good ideas and some warnings for New Zealand” (p.18). The information is patchy, to say the least. Rather than describe laws, it makes claims such as, “Research on the US’s approach to joint custody shows that it can work, but only if both parents agree on it” (p.19). No source was given for this claim, but on request I was advised by the Ministry of Justice that it was based on one paper, Hardcastle G W (1998) “Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective”, Family Law Quarterly, 32(1), Spring, pp.201-219.

 

6.      It is a concern not only that the Ministry of Justice paper relied on only one paper for its claim about US research, but also that the selected paper does not even claim to be a balanced assessment of the research. It presents a judge’s perspective, and this may arise from narrow and unrepresentative exposure. Note that the Department for Courts was not so accepting of judges' opinions in its study to determine if they had an appropriate understanding of gender issues[1].

 

7.       In his paper, Hardcastle expressed concern for what he perceived to be an overenthusiastic embracing of joint custody. The evidence he presented does not support the statement in the Ministry’s discussion paper. Hardcastle reported from a 1993 source that dual physical custody was awarded in 20 per cent of disputed US cases. He also stated that, in a 1989 survey,  “only” 35.3 percent of judges rated a joint legal and joint physical custody as their first preference.

 

8.      Hardcastle’s bias shows when he lists reasons given by judges for their concerns about joint custody, before claiming that, “No judge should accept joint custody without examination” (p.202). This illustrates problems that can be observed with legal reasoning[2]. By listing possible disadvantages, but not mentioning the advantages, Hardcastle presents only one side. It is not enough to identify problems with joint custody – any situation can have difficulties. There must be a point of comparison. What are the difficulties with sole custody, and which, in any particular case, is likely to be the least undesirable? For example, little thought is commonly given to the difficulties of re-establishing a severed relationship, although this can be a significant factor with sole custody decisions. Joint custody arrangements can always be changed to sole custody. It is much harder to have change in the other direction or to reverse custody.

 

9.       When Hardcastle sets up the issue as one of whether to accept joint custody rather than whether to reject it, the burden of proof rests with those favouring joint custody. This is surprising given various international conventions relating to families which would suggest that family relationships should not be disrupted or severed without good reason and due process[3]. The alternative to Hardcastle’s position would be to contend that, “no judge should reject joint custody without examination”. It is important to determine which question this review intends to ask.

 

10.  Part IV of Hardcastle's paper discusses process. Without using the term, he describes the effect of "the shadow of the law" when stating that "joint custody legislation places pressure on litigants to negotiate a joint custody arrangement" (pp.217-8). This is important, but surprisingly the point is lost on many in government and law, as discussed further in paragraphs 17-25.

 

The primary caregiver/care-taker

 

11.  The Ministry of Justice discussion paper also described another US method, the primary care-taker approach, where “the judge has to make decisions based on who they think was the parent who spent most time carrying out the day-to-day child care tasks before separation.” (p.19)

 

12.  We see similar reasoning presented as the sole option in a publication from the OCC[4], and in a recent speech by the Minister of Women’s Affairs[5]. The view does not go unchallenged, however. Kelly (1997) states that: “Child development research does not support the distinction between primary and secondary caretakers for children after age 4 or 5 if they have lived in the two-parent home.” [6]

 

International obligations

 

13.  Appendix 2 of the discussion paper presents international obligations “relevant to custody of and access to children”. It draws only from UNCROC, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 9.1 is mentioned, but its significance may be missed. It states that, "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child." This could possibly be interpreted to mean that interim sole-custody arrangements are questionable, and that alternatives to shared custody should only be considered when they can be shown to be superior according to a "best interest of the child" criterion.

 

14.   There are other relevant articles in UNCROC:

 

·        Article 5 says that: "States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents … to provide … appropriate direction and guidance".

 

·         In Article 7 we see that: "The child shall … have …, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents".

 

·        Article 14.2 says: "States parties shall respect the rights and duties of parents and, if applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child."

 

·        Article 18.2 requires the State to develop appropriate institutions, which would include the Family Court: "For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of the child."

·         Article 19.1, referring to mental violence, could be considered to apply to emotional abuse in the form of parental alienation: "States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child."

 

15.  There are other internationally specified rights which merit consideration. From the submission of the Human Rights Commission to the Government Administration Services Select Committee on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998 and the De Facto Relationships (Property) Bill 1998, July 1998:

 

·        "Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that men and women of full age have the right to marry and found a family; and relevantly they are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Article 16(3) provides that the family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state."

 

·        "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... Article 17 provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

 

·        "Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW] ... Article 16 provides that States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: Article 16(f) ensures the same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution."

 

16.  Article 5 of CEDAW is also relevant:

 States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:

To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;

·       To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.

 

Relevance of laws and structures – the shadow of the law

 

17.  The foreword to the Ministry of Justice discussion paper includes the following claim:

 

“If parents can agree on the important decisions about how children should be cared for, and if parents stay together, or can reach agreement about the care of children if they do separate, then the laws and structures discussed in this paper are irrelevant.” (p.3)

 

18.  The foreword was signed by Hon Margaret Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice, and Hon Steve Maharey, Minister of Social Services and Employment. They are both Government Ministers involved in formulating and recommending policy and will have been advised by the Ministry of Justice.

 

19.  The Ministers will be aware of laws on numerous diverse issues such as theft, speeding, drunk-driving, drugtaking, assault, and benefit fraud. These laws are intended to change behaviour. I doubt that they would dream of suggesting that these laws are irrelevant to all except those convicted of contravening those laws. New Zealand has seen changes to tax and benefit structures and major economic reforms on the basis that these changes will produce what is claimed to be more desirable behaviour. Actions will change to reflect the post-reform environment.

 

20.  The concept of the Shadow of the Law refers to changed behaviour of people who, while not directly using the law, take account of the anticipated outcomes were the law to be applied. Legal outcomes affect the behaviour of many more people than those directly involved.

 

21.  It stretches credibility to believe that the Ministers and the Ministry of Justice are unaware of such a fundamental aspect of policy. Yet they claim, in a document which is intended to inform the public, that such effects do not apply in the case of laws relating to guardianship, custody and access.

 

22.  The same can be said of the New Zealand Law Society. On 26th April 2000 the Family Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society issued a press release opposing the Shared Parenting Bill. It included the following statement: "…the Bill seems to ignore the fact that the vast majority of parents seem to be able to find sensible and pragmatic solutions to the problems posed by family separation without resort either to lawyers or the courts. The Section is concerned that substantive law changes are being promoted as a response to a relatively small number of difficult cases.” [7] It would be unfortunate if "difficult", and therefore unrepresentative, cases were to cast a shadow affecting the outcomes in numerous other cases where alternative, superior, solutions would otherwise have been possible.

 

23.  John Priestley QC, the Chair of the Family Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society, in a news release of 6 October 2000, was also unable to see any connection between the Court and the actions of parents. In dismissing a claim that the behaviour of the Court might affect separating parents, he said, “The large majority of separated New Zealanders put their own joint parenting arrangements into place without any need for intervention by lawyers or the Family Court”. He has since been appointed a Judge in the High Court. In that role, will he use decisions as a signal to others?

 

24.  The claim that those who reach agreement outside the court are satisfied with the outcome is even more surprising in the context of the statement by the Principal Family Court Judge that the Court is not effective at enforcing access orders.[8] If the Court is openly acknowledged to be ineffective in this area, wouldn’t that serve as a disincentive for dissatisfied people to take the matter to the Court?

 

25.  Institutions such as the Family Court do send signals and affect behaviour. It is regrettable, and not conducive to respect for society’s institutions, that there is such denial of responsibility for the effects of the actions of these institutions.

 

Analysis of submissions

 

26.  There is a call for submissions as part of the Government’s review of the legislation on guardianship, custody and access. The discussion paper contains limited and misleading information which is likely to influence those making submissions. There is no guarantee that submissions will be from people who are any better informed. Nor is it apparent that the submissions will be representative of the opinions of the wider community. From an academic perspective, therefore, it is not clear how such submissions can be analysed.

 

27.  One worrying indication of the possible misuse of submissions can be seen in a speech to the House by Hon Margaret Wilson on 13 November 2000.[9] To quote:

 

"I move that the House take note of the report of the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill incorporating Supplementary Order Paper No. 25.

During 1998 the Government and Administration Select Committee heard submissions on both bills.  Approximately 60% of submissions on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill expressed concern that it did not address the issue of economic disadvantage that can be suffered by the non-career partner on marriage breakdown.”

 

28.  Are submissions simply going to be counted as if they are votes? If so, is it appropriate to do this when, as with the bills referred to above, the matter in question was not even raised as a point for debate? Are all submissions to be given the same weight, irrespective of the bodies making the submission, whether they are groups or individuals? If submissions are to be used in this way, would it not be appropriate to have informed debate before the submissions are requested?

 

Policy and policy instruments

 

29.  There are several aspects of policymaking which may have some bearing on the matters under consideration in this review. Stated generally, effective policies require suitable policy instruments, suitably trained people to apply those instruments, and monitoring of outcomes.

 

30.  The Family Court recognizes that access orders are a poor policy instrument. They are crude and, in the present environment at least, hard to enforce. There is a simple explanation for this. The Court has taken an extreme position in creating a "favoured parent" status for the custodial parent. There is little that the Court has allowed itself to bargain with to persuade that parent to comply with the order, save the extreme threat of change of custody. The longer the period of non-compliance, the greater the disruption such a step would be for the children. The threat is scarcely credible in most cases.

 

31.  Similarly it can be hard to enforce the guardianship rights of the parent who has far less contact with the children, if only because the children will usually be more influenced by the custodial parent.

 

32.  We may be asking more from the Family Court than is possible given either available options or the Court's choice of options.

 

33.  Parenting plans could offer greater scope as they permit acknowledgement of numerous minor events which, cumulatively, may be significant. Plans recognize the importance of factors besides contact time, thus also providing other options for change.

 

34.  Policy instruments and their application depend in part on perspectives taken. The rights specified in paragraphs 13-16 above consider families in terms of the relationships between individuals, in particular the relationship between children and their parents. This is markedly different from the definition of family in the New Zealand census and the time-use survey, both of which are household-based. A parent is not recognized as such unless living in the same household as the children, and other adults who are live-in partners to a parent are considered as parents. This has numerous implications. It shapes views on parenting and non-custodial parents, it affects tax payments, it is central to child support legislation and to benefit structures. It provides a distorted view of the issues. It may be that compliance with international obligations will only really be possible when domestic policy is based on a compatible view of families.

 

35.  There are other issues to consider in relation to the training of those working in the areas of guardianship, custody and access. It is unlikely that they will have a realistic picture, given the information discussed in this submission. There are further problems in relation to supervision and accountability. The Law Society's complaints procedure was strongly criticized in the Cotter and Roper report.[10] Since its release, little has been done to improve matters. Adequate complaints procedures and professional standards are also necessary for others working in the Family Court.

 

36.  It may be appropriate to consider how well coordinated the various Family Court interventions are. Are psychologists and counsellors informed of case histories and material in case files? How much detail should be passed on from counseling sessions?

 

37.  It is unfortunate that there has been so little informed and open debate on policy issues surrounding family law and the Family Court. There is scope for far more than exists at present without threatening the secrecy of individual proceedings.

 

38.  The following Issues Papers by the Centre for Public Policy Evaluation may be relevant to the review. They are available free of charge on the internet at:

http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/papers/

·        No.1            S. Birks and G. Buurman, “Is the Legal System an Efficient Regulatory and Dispute Resolution Device”, October 1997.

 

39.  Issues Paper No.10, forthcoming, will contain papers presented at the Social Policy Forum, Children's Rights and Families, held in Wellington on 26 October 2000.

 

 



[1] Barwick H, Burns J and Gray A (1996) Gender Equity in the New Zealand Judicial System: Judges' Perceptions of Gender Issues, Judicial Working Group on Gender Equity, Department for Courts.

[2] See Birks S (2000) "Legal Reasoning", chapter 5 in Birks S (ed) (2000) Analytical Skills for Social Issues: Reason or Delusion? Issues Paper No. 8, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University.

[3] See paragraphs 13-16 below.

[4] See p. 32 of Julian R (1999) Fathering in the New Millenium, Wellington: Office of the Commissioner for Children.

[5] "At this point the [custody] decision is not made on the basis of gender. The reason custody is normally awarded to mothers is that they are usually the primary caregiver."  Hon. Laila Harre, Address to Social Policy 2000 - Children's Rights and Families, Wellington, 26 October 2000. http://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speechralph=32804&SR=1

[6] P.383 of Kelly J B (1997) “The best interests of the child: a concept in search of meaning”, Family and Conciliation Courts Review, 35(4), October, pp.377-387. The primary caregiver concept is also discussed in Birks S (1999) "Parenting and the Family Court: An Economist's Perspective", chapter 8 in Birks S and Callister P (eds) (1999) Perspectives on Fathering II, Issues Paper No. 6, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University.

[7] http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/fls/news/sharedp.htm

[8] Assignment, TV1, 8.30pm, 16 November 2000

[9] http://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speechralph=33033&SR=1, 13/11/00, Hon Margaret Wilson, Property (Relationships) Bill, [Report-back speech]

[10]  W Brent Cotter QC and Christopher Roper, Report on a project on Education and Training in Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility for the Council of Legal Education and the New Zealand Law Society, undated, but released in 1997.