Equal
Employment Opportunities and Policy
By
Stuart Birks*
A
paper for a joint LEANZ/Education Forum seminar
1. Introductory comment
When Rachel was undertaking the research that she has just described, she repeatedly said that it was “just common sense”.[1]
Unfortunately in many areas these days common sense appears to be a rare commodity. The type of thinking that she critically describes did not arise in a vacuum. There is an environment that is conducive to such work. It is my intention to present here this broader context.
The material to be covered here has implications for:
· education, in terms of both the wider implications of current policies for pupils’ adult lives and careers, and social implications of curriculum content;
· law, as a vehicle for implementation of policy, and in terms of recognition of its limitations and possible fundamental principles; and
· economics, in relation to debate on economic issues and available policy options, and the importance of process in relation to outcomes and welfare.
2. Misinformation
on Pay Equity and Equal Employment Opportunities
This year has
seen the publication of two major documents on pay equity and employment
opportunities. March saw the Report of
the Taskforce on: Pay and Employment Equity in the Public Service and the
Public Health and Public Education Sectors (the Taskforce report).[2] The Human Rights
Commission released a report in June 2004, Framework for the Future: Equal
Employment Opportunities in New Zealand (the HRC report).[3]
The latter is more general in its coverage, and I shall discuss it first. It is worth noting the important role envisaged for legislation in the recommendations for major policy change. In particular, rather than simply legislating against negative behaviour, the suggestion is for positive duties to be placed on all employers, with penalties for failure to comply. The public sector is proposed as a testing ground for such policies, indicating the significance of the Taskforce report discussed later.
2.1 The HRC Report
While the title of the HRC report suggests an objective specified in terms of opportunities, the document actually focuses on outcomes. Hence:
“…more effort will need to be made in the future to
ensure that women, Maori, and Pacific peoples are well represented across all
industries and occupational groupings.” (p.19)
and:
“Of the four EEO
target groups, women have achieved the most progress in their relative position
in the
To emphasise the point, we see that success for women is to be measured
in terms of their being widely distributed across all industries and
occupational groups, and displaying equality with men in terms of pay,
participation and seniority. This can
only reflect equity and equal opportunities if there is a close match in the
preferences and abilities of men and women. This is not the case now, and may
not be in the near future. Men and women
have different attitudes to workforce participation and to full- versus
part-time work, for example. Nevertheless, equality of outcome for men and
women has already been given as an objective by members of the current
government.[4]
The report discusses evidence on discrimination:
“Human Rights
Commission figures offer some insights into the prevalence of discrimination on
the grounds of interest to us. However, they do not allow us to determine the
gender of the complainants… To that extent, we are limited in the implications
we might draw from the following information.” (p.60)
Despite this reservation, we read on the next page: “It is troubling that there is so much evidence of direct discrimination
against women and of sexual harassment of women at work.” (p.61)
The main evidence is that, in the four years to June 2003, there were
532 complaints “consistent with forms of discrimination against women”, and 110
complaints “related to discrimination on the basis of family status or marital
status”. They do not state how many of these complaints were upheld.
The report continues:
“…indirect forms of
discrimination also continue to hold women back. For example, the structuring
of the workplace, the intensive nature of some training programmes, and the
expectations of the hours people must work to obtain management positions can
each serve to preserve competitive, male-dominated cultures. Such formal and
informal institutional structures could be changed. But change is unlikely when
the institutional power resides with those who most benefit from current
arrangements.” (p.61)
It would appear that, according to the report, criteria for promotion which may, on average, suit women less than men, can be considered to be discriminatory. Surely discrimination can only be said to exist if people are treated differently for no valid reason. Is it really discriminatory to link promotion to training and experience?
The claimed undesirability of “competitive, male-dominated cultures” is also problematic. If the Human Rights Commission and/or the government are uncomfortable with competition in the labour market, then perhaps these matters merit a wider airing. It would be most helpful if the government could explain its concerns and detail the alternative job selection and promotion criteria that it has in mind. Should there be quotas for various groups, or should experience and qualifications be disallowed as criteria for favouring applicants? Certainly in the area of international trade, the government appears to be keen to reduce barriers to competition, as if competition is desirable. Are there grounds for objecting to competition in labour markets?
The failure to present these issues as debating points may
be due in part to the motivation of the authors. The report advocates a
position, rather than presenting balanced assessments. This can be seen in the
section on “rationales for promoting EEO in
“We believe that advocates for EEO should be cognisant of the full range of rationales when determining how best to make their arguments for policy change…If presented with [these arguments] only the most ardently conservative people would choose to stand in the way of future EEO initiatives.” (pp.15-16)
It is clear on which side the report’s authors stand.
Policy ideas are frequently transplanted from one country to another, not necessarily with careful scrutiny on the way. The report illustrates this when it states:
“The Australian Federal Equal Opportunity for
Women Agency lists five ways in which EEO for women can “boost profitability”
supported by statistical and case study evidence…lastly, having EEO policies
and programmes in place reduces the risk that companies will be subject to
prosecution under human rights antidiscrimination and employment legislation.” (p.21)
Perhaps this is what is meant by competitive structures being undesirable. They can lower company profitability through incurring the displeasure of, and penalties imposed by, government. However, this does not mean that the company decisions would have been inherently undesirable.
2.2 The Taskforce Report
The Taskforce report is narrower in scope than that of the Human Rights
Commission, referring only to the public service, public health and public
education sectors. However, it is closer to being an active policy document,
rather than a basis for discussion. Recall that the HRC report recommended that
policies be tested in the public sector. Some of the language conveys the
impression that economics underpins the reasoning, but aspects fundamental to
economists have been overlooked. This is apparent from the Preface, where it
says, “The scale
and persistence of the gender pay gap in
No conventional explanation is given as to how or why the market fails. Instead, it could be asked why one should expect there to be no gender pay gap with a correctly functioning market. Should the same assumption be made for comparisons between ethnic groups, or for people of differing ages[5]? If pay differences are acceptable by age, might this reflect experience? If so, then should we not also accept gender gaps caused by differing lifetime workforce participation patterns? The report’s use of inverted commas for the word “market” indicates scepticism about the entire pay determination process.
I suggest to my students that they pose the following three questions when asking if intervention, or a change in intervention, should be undertaken:
1) Is there something wrong with the non-intervention/status quo situation?
If no, there are no grounds for intervention. If yes:
2) Are there policy options that can improve on non-intervention?
Note that policies affect the future, not the present, so there has to be an identifiable problem affecting the future, not just the affecting the present.
If there are suitable policies:
3) Will available policies be used to meet these objectives, or for
other purposes? (i.e. can decision makers be trusted to use the policies
appropriately?)
A standard economic approach to question 1 would be to ask if there is market failure. Such a failure, and its magnitude, have yet to be demonstrated in this case. It is not sufficient to assert that there should be no gender pay gap, so, on that basis, the report does not even get past the first question.
The Preface includes the following:
“It is acknowledged that the tight timeframe for the Taskforce made it necessary to use less formal research methodologies than could have been employed in a longer timeframe…[however] Social reform of this nature while supported by research and cost/benefit analysis is rarely driven by such things. Visionary and determined leadership from Government and chief executives is essential.” (p.1)
In other words, this major policy initiative is not well researched, but it is claimed that, as research is not sufficient on its own, neither is it necessary, and so the policy should be vigorously implemented anyway. Given the radical objective identified above, equal outcomes for men and women, surely the economics surrounding this matter should be carefully researched, and the public consulted. The implications of the objective are highly significant:
“The issue is more than a matter of equal treatment and social justice. Without action, the education and skills of women will be wasted.” (p.1)
To rephrase this, having raised a generation of young women to believe that “girls can do anything”, they are now expected to participate fully in the paid workforce. This may well not match their aspirations or expectations. It may also have a significant effect on family formation and stability, and the work-life experiences of generations of New Zealanders. The use of past and present education as a justification for future workplace policies should be noted. Did people know what they were buying into when they made their education decisions?
Although
“The Terms of
Reference set out the following principles to govern the work of the
Taskforce:…
iii) That the plan of action should be capable of being implemented over five years in order that the necessary changes in practice and culture become embedded in the fabric and culture of New Zealand society.” (p.1)
The report does attempt an explanation as to why a gender pay gap may be the result of distortions in the market:
“The
key issue is the lack of equal pay for work of equal value that is done
predominantly by women.
There are complex connections between “female” occupations, skill
recognition, female stereotyping, and rates of pay. Some of the skills involved
in typical women’s occupations:
… are often considered to be simply “natural”
attributes of women, rather than being developed through learning, practice and
experience. The skills required in interacting well with people (managers,
staff or clients) and in other kinds of emotional labour often go unnoticed…
complex interpersonal skills, heavy physical effort and responsibility for life
and death are requirements of many jobs caring for children, the sick, the
elderly. These components are likely to be undervalued in women’s pay packets.” (p.28)[6]
An economist would have a problem with such
an explanation. The price that a buyer is prepared to pay for a service
reflects the value of the service to the buyer. The same sum would be paid to
either of two people, one of whom had a natural ability and the other who
needed hours of practice. Perhaps a stronger point is being argued. Is it being
suggested that women collectively are not being paid for a range of skills that
they uniquely possess? If so, the existence of such skills is debatable. If
they do exist, then their zero price in association with a positive marginal
value cannot simply be asserted. Why does the market fail to recognise these
skills which give value and are in scarce supply?
This illustrates the significance of my third
question above: “will available policies be used to
meet these objectives, or for other purposes?” Market failure may
be used as a partial justification for intervention, but that does not equate
to the language of market failure being sufficient to support intervention when
no market failure has been demonstrated.[7]
Similarly,
an economic explanation should be given for the use of “inequitable” in the
following:
“Where part-time work is the only way in which women can combine paid
work with family responsibilities, it is likely to be chosen regardless of
inequitable pay and conditions.” (p.40)
What does “inequitable” mean in this context,
and is it justified? Is the pay not related to productivity? If not, how does
this arise in the labour market? Alternatively, if it is, related to
productivity, why suggest that it should be based on other criteria?
Table 1 on p.23 of the Taskforce report gives
average hourly earnings by age group, from the June 2003 quarter Income Survey.
It is notable that, for the 25-29 age group, women’s pay was, on average, 3.1%
higher than men’s. It has to be asked whether the gender pay gap, as observed
overall, is a result of individuals’ historical education and workforce
decisions, and the aggregation of quite different age cohorts. As policies
affect the future, not the present, and, even without intervention, changes can
be expected, is the current gender pay gap a suitable indicator on which to
base policy decisions? In pursuit of an outcome measured by an overall indicator,
might perverse inequities result for specific sub-groups? In particular, are we
likely to be unduly favouring those young women who are committed to a career,
and might we be penalising young men in the process?
Ministry of Education figures show that, in
2002, there were 192,257 male and 260,164 female students.[8]
In other words, female students outnumbered males by 35%. The same source shows
that females outnumbered males in public tertiary institutions by 40%. This
reflects a longer term trend of female students increasingly outnumbering male
tertiary students, with the corresponding figures for 1999 being 24% and 25%.
It is inevitable that this will have a major impact on future employment
patterns. Despite this, the EEO initiatives suggested in these reports are
based on the current situation, and hence, implicitly, on the assumption that,
without further intervention, the current situation will continue into the
future.
3.
Broader implications
There are several grounds for concern in that this sort of misinformation may reflect wider problems.
The HRC report
was written by two
Further grounds for concern are provided by the National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women, which consists solely of women. Eight of the council members are appointed by the Minister of Labour, two represent the unions, and one represents Business New Zealand. The NACEW organised a conference at the end of June 2004 on pay and employment equity for women.[9] Papers predominantly supported the government’s preferred position. The 10 conference keynote speakers were all women. Only one of the 22 session papers was authored by men.
3.1
Questioning Affirmative Action
The two reports promote affirmative action, without addressing potential problems. The issue of affirmative action has been critically considered in a recently published book by Thomas Sowell.[10] Among the points he raises:
a) He asks, if differences are taken to demonstrate discrimination, does the success of Jews or Chinese demonstrate that they discriminate against the dominant majorities? (Sowell p.170-172) To take this point further, if differences between men and women are taken as being the result of discrimination, how are differences between women explained?
b) He cautions about the effects of affirmative action policies:
“…there is much in the history of affirmative action policies around the world that should never be repeated. In too many countries, such policies have turned out to be ways of producing relatively minor benefits for a few and major problems for society as a whole.” (ibid p.166)
“…similar incentives and constraints tend to produce similar consequences among human beings in widely disparate circumstances. The fact that many of these consequences were not anticipated by those who promoted group preferences creates a painful contrast with the confident and sweeping assertions with which such policies were begun. Those who thought that they were directing the course of events often discovered that they had simply opened the floodgates and that events were taking a course far different from what had been envisioned.” (pp.166-7)
In neither of the reports discussed above was there any detailed analysis of the possible effects of suggested policies, taking into account changed incentives and resulting changed behaviour.
c) He talks of the true effects of affirmative action policies being disguised through considering overall outcomes for whole groups, rather than identifying any changed outcomes for those directly affected by the policies. In the context of this paper, how many women would have successful careers without special measures being taken? More generally, the effects of an implemented policy can only really be assessed in comparison to what would have happened otherwise, a situation which we do not usually observe.
d) There can be significant political consequences from affirmative action policies:
“…it was not the disparities, but the politicization of those disparities and promotion of group identity politics, which was the harbinger of intergroup hostility and violence.” (p.179)
“…success at group identity politics tends to expand the list of grievances and ‘enemies’ necessary to keep the movement viable and its leaders powerful.” (p.180)
“What a movement needs for its own survival is not a set of concessions won in the past, though these may be celebrated, but an inventory of demands still outstanding, grievances still unassuaged, and ‘enemies’ still to be dealt with.” (p.181)
Note that
affirmative action has an impact not just in terms of “righting wrongs”, but
also, above and beyond addressing the issues, through changing the political
dynamics.
e) A focus on affirmative action and associated indicators could direct attention away from other, relevant issues and solutions. As an analogous example, Sowell writes:
“In the field of medicine, it has long been recognised that even a false cure that is wholly harmless in itself can be catastrophic in its consequences if it substitutes for a real cure for a deadly disease.” (p.185)
f) Policies may not benefit those most disadvantaged: “…preferential programmes for the less fortunate [groups] end up helping disproportionately the more fortunate [within the groups]” (p.187) Moreover: “The very modest benefits of affirmative action, concentrated on those already more fortunate, with little or no benefits to those who are truly disadvantaged, has often been blamed on insufficient zeal, or even bad faith, on the part of those administering affirmative action programmes.” (pp.195-6) This last point may be illustrated by the discussion on “normative commitment” on pp.118-9 of the HRC Report.
g) Affirmative action 1) leads people to question the actual achievements of those in the favoured groups, and 2) can lead to a withdrawal (e.g. emigration) of members of non-favoured groups (p.197).
Sowell is highly critical of affirmative action, but he illustrates his points with observations from past experience, and he highlights potential problems with affirmative action policies. Any balanced assessment of such policies should consider these points.
3.2 Democratic Fundamentals
Perhaps the greatest concern that I would
have with the New Zealand policy scene described here is that it shows little
regard for, or understanding of, some of the fundamental aspects of a
democracy. While there is no unique democratic structure, all democracies are
based on complex checks and balances. These have evolved over time in
recognition of the dangers arising from too great a concentration of power in
the hands of a small number of people. Institutions have sometimes clearly
defined functions, such as universities being independent critics of society,
while maintaining academic rigour. People in key positions, ministers, judges,
senior public servants, have associated responsibilities, which should also
constrain their behaviour. It may not be possible to specify precisely and
uniquely the fundamental institutional aspects of democracy, but we may be able
to identify situations where some of these aspects appear to be disregarded.
The following are indicative of these issues.
Recently,
compensation was awarded to six people who had been mistreated while in prison.
In a media release on
"I find it personally offensive that
people who have shown no consideration for their victims, have committed
grievous crimes, and frequently show no remorse whatsoever, should have to be
compensated for alleged wrongs done to them." [11]
I include this
here because it raises numerous questions of general relevance. Law is central
to the implementation of much economic policy. Members of Parliament see
legislation, including that arising from private members’ bills, as a major
mechanism for influencing policy. The operation of, and compliance with the law
depend on public perceptions of the law and legal institutions. Phil Goff’s
statement and subsequent actions lead me to ask the following:
Is it appropriate
for a Minister of Justice 1) to be so critical of judicial decisions based on
the law as it stands? and 2) to refer to “alleged” wrongs, if a legal judgement
has been made?
Is his objection
in relation to the compensation, or to the enforcement of the legal rights of
prisoners?
It would appear
that the fundamental issue is that we have two approaches operating in
parallel. One focuses on penalties for the offender, and the other on
compensation for the victim. The Minister appears to object to someone being
imprisoned through the former approach, and then receiving compensation under
the latter on another matter. Surely the issue is one of parallel systems
giving possible inconsistencies. These systems have been introduced through
legislation passed by Parliament. It is therefore for Parliament to debate and,
if necessary, resolve this wider issue. It is not for the Minister of Justice
to criticise lawyers and judges for implementing the law as given. His current
reaction is not conducive to respect for the law, or, arguably, maintaining the
dignity of his office.
This is a single
example, but there was no marked response suggesting inappropriate behaviour.
Presumably, therefore, it was considered acceptable, or at least
unremarkable. In that lies its
significance. Can we expect laws to be made and implemented in an orderly and
consistent manner, with respect for broader principles and an understanding of
institutional boundaries? If this is in doubt, then legislation is suspect in
any area, including that of pay and employment equity.
3.2.2
Government, Sheilas and changing culture
I want
now to return to the issue of policies to change the culture of
“Social action now
Ask the students as a class
to make a list of all the methods of creating social change that they can think
of… These include and are not limited to:
·
Petitions and referenda
·
Protest marches and hikoi
·
Sit-ins
·
Starting action and/or consciousness raising groups
·
Going door to door
·
Mass media activity:
o
Press releases
o
Contacting television and radio news
o
Starting web sites, web logs, mailing lists and newsgroups
o
Making and distributing flyers and posters
o
Publishing books”
(p.9)
I find it notable that there is no mention of such normal democratic channels as voting, approaching your their MP, making a submission to a select committee, or joining a political party. Nor is it suggested that they might need to learn about the issues, debate with others and find their views, or identify and weigh up possible policy options. There is not even the idea that students could learn from history, although, to quote George Santayana, “Those who cannot learn form history are doomed to repeat it.” Should our children be taught in school that participating in a democracy is a matter of demonstrating, protesting and “consciousness raising”, with no requirement to become informed first?
A while ago
someone pointed me to the proceedings of a seminar on human rights held in
The seminar included a response by Pamela Jefferies, a Human Rights Commissioner. Her response led me to view Epstein’s position far more favourably. In particular, she demonstrated that, once it is accepted that legislation can be used to differentiate between individuals according to membership of a group, the reasoning underpinning the interventions could be strongly agenda-driven and ideological. For example, she states favourably that women comprised more than 50 percent of the enrolments in both law schools and accounting schools. The same could be said of medical schools, and this has been recognised as potentially problematic due to lower workforce participation by women doctors.[14] She also says that, prior to 1977:
“It was quite legitimate for an employer
to say to an individual: ‘We will not employ you for this particular job
because you are a woman. This career is not available to you.’” (Epstein p.19)
This does not mean
that such a problem necessarily existed, or that there were no reasons for
selecting men over women. Nor does it mean that there were or are no situations
where men might be treated less favourably than women, or that principles are
applied consistently over a range of issues. In fact, the gendered approach to
policy has led to overt differential treatment of men and women. For example,
domestic violence legislation includes the gender specific charge of male
assaults female, and the Domestic Violence Act is openly described as having at
its heart the concept that “domestic violence is about the use of power by men
to control their women partners”.[15]
Jefferies also refers to legislative responses to CEDAW and UNCROC, although
these have been drawn on selectively to support specific positions, rather than
being considered in their entirety.[16]
If there are reasons to doubt the suitability of policies, and policies may not be applied with due analysis of the consequences, then there are strong grounds for limiting the powers available. This point was also made when discussing my three questions in section 2.2 above.
In economics,
collective choice literature such as Sen (1970) recognises that we may be
concerned not only with the choices made, but also with the way in which those
choices are determined. A similar theme can be found in literature on
procedural justice. While this originates in psychological and legal writing,
the principles have more recently been applied to decision making more
generally. Several procedural elements have been identified.
…four elements of procedures are the primary factors that contribute to judgements about their fairness: opportunities for participation (voice), the neutrality of the forum, the trustworthiness of the authorities, and the degree to which people receive treatment with dignity and respect.” (p.121)
It could be an interesting and fruitful exercise to see whether, on these principles, policy development is considered to be procedurally fair.
4.
Conclusions
I began by saying that this paper had implications for education, law and economics. Briefly, and in turn these implications are:
For education, are our young people being taught how our political systems should work? Is there a need for structured civics education? Also, when shaping our education programmes, we should ensure that we are asking the right questions. In particular, are we educating for the sort of future lives young people, want to have?
For law, legislation results from political processes. There may be underlying agendas and imperfect debate. There needs to be an awareness of both the limitations and the underlying principles of law.
For economics, while regulation got a bad name under Muldoon, there may be a resurgence with increased state interference in people’s personal lives without regard for economic factors. The criteria of procedural justice may also provide a fruitful area for research.
References
Books, etc.:
Baxter R and Birks S (2004) The Student Debt Debate: An Economic Investigation of the Issues, Student Paper No.5, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/papers/cppesp05/cppesp05.pdf
Birks S (ed.)
(2000) Inclusion or Exvclusion:
Family Strategy and Policy, Issues Paper No.9, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation,
Birks S (2003)
“Aggregation, Bias and Confusion – Distortions in Policy”, Chapter 3 of Birks S
(ed.) (2003) Economics and Policy –
Worlds Apart? Issues Paper No.14, Centre for Public Policy Evaluation,
Collie L and Marquat
S (2004) Sheilas 28 years on, Studyguide
http://images.tvnz.co.nz/tvnz_images/tvone/study_guides/sheilas.pdf
Epstein R (1996)
Human Rights and Anti-discrimination
Legislation,
Mintrom M and True J (2004) Framework
for the Future: Equal Employment Opportunities in New Zealand,
Sen A K (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare,
Sowell T (2004) Affirmative
Action Around the World: An Empirical Study,
Taskforce (2004)
Report of the Taskforce on: Pay and
Employment Equity in the Public Service and the Public Health and Public
Education Sectors,
Tyler T (2000) “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure”, International Journal of Psychology, Vol.35(2), pp.117-125
Vincent C (1996)
“Parent Empowerment? Collective action and inaction in education”,
Media releases:
Minister of Justice Phil Goff on
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/PrintDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20808
State Services
Minister Trevor Mallard on
Minister of Women’s Affairs Ruth Dyson on
Minister of Women’s Affairs Ruth Dyson on
Media articles:
McCurdy D (2004) “Women widen horizons in medical world”, New Zealand Herald, 4 September
“Unhealthy
appearance”, The Times (
“Violinists' fury at 'pay fiddle'”,
* Centre for Public Policy Evaluation,
[1] This paper forms the second part of a
joint presentation with
[2] Taskforce (2004)
[3] Mintrom and
True (2004)
[4]
State Services Minister Trevor Mallard on 12 August 2003, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=17544,
and Minister of Women’s Affairs Ruth Dyson in an identical release on the same
day, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=17545,
and again in a release on 16 December, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=18648
[5] The HRC Report does give a brief mention
to age, but in terms of claims that it is harder for older unemployed to find
work.
[6] Although this extract from the report
includes a quote, no precise source is given. Rather, four documents are listed
in a footnote, with no specific page number for any of them.
[7] There was another recent example of non-market
reasoning being used to claim higher pay: “Violinists in a German
orchestra are suing for a pay rise on the grounds that they play many more
notes per concert than their colleagues.” (“Violinists' fury at 'pay fiddle'”,
[8] Tertiary
Education Full Year Key Statistics and Indicators 1999 – 2002, for Tertiary
Education Providers Funded by the Ministry of Education or Delivering to
Students in Receipt of Student Loans and/or Allowances, http://www.minedu.govt.nz/web/downloadable/dl7548_v1/7548-key-indicators-ts-2002.xls
[10] Sowell (2004). There are parallels with
some of his points in a
[12]
Collie L and Marquat
S (2004)
[13] There could be parallels with the
discussion of empowerment in Vincent (1996). She refers to a social democratic
understanding of empoewerment, in the context of
“powerless groups”. She suggests that this concept was usurped by
conservatives, who refocused it in individualistic terms, irrespective of
circumstances.
[14] See, for example, “Unhealthy appearance”, The Times (
[15] In a submission by the Women’s
Consultative Group of the New Zealand Law Society to the Law Commission on Preliminary Paper No.41: Battered
Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who Offend, 8 November 2000.
[16] On CEDAW, see for example p36 of Birks
(2003). On UNCROC, see for example pp.51-52 of Birks (2000).